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Abstract. There has been considerable and growing interest in ap-
plying machine learning for cyber defenses. One promising approach
has been to apply natural language processing techniques to analyze
logs data for suspicious behavior. A natural question arises to how
robust these systems are to adversarial attacks. Defense against so-
phisticated attack is of particular concern for cyber defenses. In this
paper, we develop a testing framework to evaluate adversarial robust-
ness of machine learning cyber defenses, particularly those focused
on log data. Our framework uses techniques from deep reinforcement
learning and adversarial natural language processing. We validate our
framework using a publicly available dataset and demonstrate that
our adversarial attack does succeed against the target systems, reveal-
ing a potential vulnerability. We apply our framework to analyze the
influence of different levels of dropout regularization and find that
higher dropout levels increases robustness. Moreover 90% dropout
probability exhibited the highest level of robustness by a significant
margin, which suggests unusually high dropout may be necessary to
properly protect against adversarial attacks.
1 INTRODUCTION
There has been considerable and growing interest in applying ma-
chine learning for cyber defenses [2, 3]. This interest is not only
academic but has found its way to commercial defensive tools as
well. One promising approach is to apply natural language process-
ing techniques to various kind of log data, such as operating system
or server logs [1, 4, 18, 19, 23]. These algorithms use an unsuper-
vised anomaly detection approach that first learn a baseline of nor-
mal behavior for a set of logs and then flag as suspicious any behavior
that deviates from this baseline.
As these approaches become more common, a natural question
arises to how robust these systems are to adversarial attacks, particu-
larly offensive uses of machine learning. Adversarial robustness has
been a growing concern across machine learning [5, 16], but these
concerns are particularly sharp in cyber defense where sophisticated
attacks are expected. And there has indeed been a growing body of
research into adversarial robustness of cyber defenses that use ma-
chine learning [8, 13, 20], although none that focus on log data.
These adversarial attacks train a generative model to produce data
that fool the cyber detector, which allows malicious behavior to pass
undetected.
In this paper, we develop a adversarial attack algorithm to evaluate
the robustness of machine learning anomaly detection models on log
data. Our attack uses techniques from deep reinforcement learning
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[15, 22] and adversarial natural language processing [12, 24]. Using
publicly available data, we demonstrate that this type of adversarial
attack does work, revealing a potential vulnerability. We then apply
our framework to analyze the influence of different levels of dropout
regularization. We find that robustness against adversarial attack in-
creases with higher dropout levels. Moreover, the most robustness
by a significant margin occurs at 90% drop probability, which is well
outside the usual range for the models we use. This suggests counter-
intuitively high levels of dropout may be required to protect against
adversarial attacks.
Our adversarial attack focuses on the case where the attacker has
acquired a black-box copy of the detector model and uses its feed-
back to train a generative model that can fool the detector. By “black-
box”, we mean the attacker does not have access to the internal work-
ings of the detector, such as model parameters and learned weights,
since that information may be encrypted or otherwise inaccessible.
Instead, the attacker can only use the detector to get anomaly scores
for different inputs. The attacker could acquire the detector by either
stealing it or using live feedback from the detector in its operational
environment. The second case assumes the attacker can observe the
live output of the detector and had some ability to manipulate inputs
on the system.
Another key feature of our approach is we do not assume the at-
tacker has access to the data on which the detector was trained, or any
data closely matching it. We believe this increases realism in the case
of attacks against unsupervised anomaly detection models. Those un-
supervised models are trained to understand specific patterns of the
networks where they are deployed. Hence, getting representative data
means getting data from those specific devices, which can be quite
large and decentralized.
Our attack framework does allow the attacker access to a small
pretraining dataset that only loosely resembles the type of data the
detector expects to ingest. This pretrain dataset is constructed based
on the attacker’s best guess of what the target system looks like. For
example, a loosely representative set of operating systems logs can
be generated by general familiarity with how that operating systems
works. Alternatively, data that is out of date or from an emulated
environment could be used. We assume this pretrain data is not suffi-
cient to train a useful model, but is instead used to learn some basic
structure and a partial vocabulary. In our experiments, we construct
the pretrain data using a small subset of the data and adding signifi-
cant noise by shuffling the data within each column. Our experimen-
tal results demonstrate that this pretrain data is not enough to train a
useful model on its own.
We test our adversarial attack algorithm using publicly available
data from Los Alamos National Lab (LANL) [9, 10].3 The data con-
3 Data available at https://csr.lanl.gov/data/cyber1/.
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tains authentication logs from their internal networks collected over
the span of 58 days. We train unsupervised anomaly detection models
by following previous work by Brown et al. [1] on the same dataset.
We train six such anomaly detectors with different levels of dropout
regularization (0%, 10%, 30%, 50%, 70%, and 90%). We then ap-
ply our adversarial attack algorithm to each of these six models to
determine which is the most robust to adversarial attack.
Our results demonstrate that our adversarial attack produces a gen-
erative model that can successfully fool the detector, revealing a po-
tential vulnerability. We also show that the robustness against this
type of attack increases with higher levels of dropout regularization
in the detector. Robustness was especially increased at dropout of
90%, which is well above the level typically used. This implies that
unusually high dropout levels increases robustness may be necessary
to defend against an adversarial attack. Additionally, higher dropout
models perform worse on the baseline detection task without an ad-
versary. Hence, there appears to be a trade-off between the most ro-
bust model and those that perform best at their baseline task, which
is in line with what has been observed elsewhere [17].
Much of the previous adversarial attack literature uses small per-
turbations that change how a data point is classified [16]. In the image
domain, these changes are often so small as to be practical imper-
ceptible. However, log data is more discrete than images, and it is
generally not possible to make any change that would be impercep-
tible. Hence, we do not focus on small perturbations, but rather on
generating log lines that are classified as not suspicious. Of course,
the generative model can be tasked to match certain features of a real
data point, such as a particular user name or timestamp, but that is
not something we explore here.
Relative to the previous literature on adversarial attacks on ma-
chine learning cyber defenses, we provide three contributions. First,
we develop a framework specific to anomaly detection systems that
analyze logs. Previous work focuses on other types of largely numer-
ical data, such as [13, 20] that look at network flow data with most
features being binary zero or one. Our use case requires us to lever-
age natural language processing approaches to deal with log data.
Our second contribution is our finding that robustness against adver-
sarial attack increases with the level of dropout regularization, with a
large jump at 90%. Our third contribution is showing how an adver-
sarial attack can proceed when the attacker does not have access to
the data the detector was trained on, nor any close substitute. Much of
the prior work allows access to this data to train a surrogate detector
model, which is then used to train the generative model.
2 ADVERSARIAL ATTACK ALGORITHM
In this section, we describe our adversarial attack algorithm. There
is a given black-box detector D that maps inputs to anomaly scores.
Our algorithm constructs a generatorGθ that deceivesD, in the sense
that Gθ generates fake data that is assigned low anomaly scores by
D. The success of Gθ at this deception can be measured using stan-
dard metrics on the anomaly score’s ability to distinguish fake from
real data, as we will discuss in more detail in Section 3.
The inputs to D are some form of sequence data. Our motivating
example is log lines, but our framework could equally be applied
to other types of sequential data such as network packet captures.
Inputs are of the form X = (x1, ..., xT ), where xt is the tth “word”
in the sequence. The length T is allowed to vary between examples.
Each sequence starts with a “start of line” token. The sequence may
also end with an “end of line” token, which we interpret to mean the
sequence is complete. We will also deal with partial sequences that
do not have an end of line token. These tokens do not need to be in
the raw input data, but can be added as needed. For sequence X , we
will use X1:t to mean the sub-sequence containing the first t words
of X .
Gθ is any neural network sequence generation model with param-
eters θ. For any sequence X = (x1, ..., xt), the generator assigns a
distribution over the next word in the sequence. We useGθ(xt+1|X)
to indicate the probability that the next word is xt+1 given sequence
X . The distribution includes the possibility of the “end of line” token
indicating the sequence is complete. By recursively drawing words
from this distribution until the end of line token is reached, Gθ can
be used to finish any partial sequence. Gθ can also be used to make
a brand new sequence by starting from the start of line token.
Our framework does not specify the details of Gθ , such as the ar-
chitecture or whether it operates on a character or word level. This
allows for any sequence generation neural network model to be used.
We do require that Gθ is compatible with backward propagation.
Section 3 provides details on the specific model we use in our ex-
perimental setup.
Gθ is trained using deep reinforcement learning on the feedback
given by the detector’s anomaly scores. Our approach uses policy
gradient methods and the REINFORCE algorithm [15, 22], simi-
lar to how these techniques have been applied to sequence data in
the natural language processing domain [12, 24]. The mathematical
foundations for our approach can be found in those cited works and
is therefore omitted here.
The training procedure lasts for N steps. Each step proceeds as
follows. First, Gθ is used to generate a new complete sequence X =
(x1, ..., xT ). Next, for each t = 1, ..., T , we use Gθ to generate r
complete sequences that start from Xi:t. The detector is then used to
assign an anomaly score to each of these r sequences. We take the
average of these scores, which we denoteQt. Note that for t = T , the
sequence X1:T is already complete, so QT will just be the anomaly
score assigned to the initial sequence X .
At each step n, we calculate an estimate for the average anomaly
score given to a new sequence generated by Gθ , which we denote
Q¯n. We do so by taking a rolling average of the anomaly scores as-
signed to the new sequences from the previous 500 steps. Note that
Q¯n is calculated using the brand new sequences generated at the start
of each step and not the r sequence completions. At the start of train-
ing, Q¯1 is initialized by generating five hundred sequences using the
initial generator.
The differenceQt−Q¯n provides an estimate of how suspicious the
detector finds the partial sequence X1:t, as compared to an average
sequence generated by Gθ . We use Qt − Q¯n as an estimate of Gθ’s
loss for adding xt to the sequence X1:t−1. Therefore, we update the
parameters θ using the following formula:
θ ← θ − α
T∑
t=1
(Qt − Q¯n)∇θ log(Gθ(xt|X1:t−1) + ε) (1)
The parameter α > 0 is the learning rate, and the parameter ε is a
small value used to avoid taking the log of zero. We used ε = 10−7,
but any sufficiently small strictly positive value would work.
Including the Q¯n term was crucial to making the adversarial attack
work. This type of term was used in some previous works using rein-
forcement learning on natural language (such as [12]), but not others
(such as [24]). Without the Q¯n term, the generator either did not im-
prove or saw the loss oscillate during training. This is likely due to
the fact that the magnitude of Qt varies quite a bit over the course of
training. Without Q¯n, this would lead to very different loss magni-
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tudes that are not accounted for by one learning rate. Either the train-
ing will be too fast whenQt is large leading to oscillation, or training
will be too slow whenQt is too small leading to no improvement. Of
course, this could be corrected by a dynamically adjusted learning
rate, but the addition of Q¯n is simpler and more directly addresses
the problem.
The updating rule described in Equation 1 can be straight-
forwardly modified to use a more sophisticated optimization proce-
dure, such as the Adam optimizer [11]. Also, it should be noted that
the gradient is not applied to Qt. In other words, Qt is treated as a
constant even though the parameters θ do influence its value since
Qt is based on sequence completions done by Gθ . This is in line
with the REINFORCE algorithm and the mathematical justification
for this can be found in prior work [15, 24].
Gθ is pretrained on a set of sequence data Xpre. As noted in the
introduction, Xpre is assumed to only loosely resemble the data that
the detector is trained on, and is not sufficient on its own to train a
useful generator. The pretraining is only needed so that Gθ can learn
the basic structure of the data, such as an estimate of sequence length
and a vocabulary that least partially overlaps with the vocabulary the
detector expects. The pretraining is done using the standard next to-
ken prediction task using cross entropy loss and the Adam optimizer.
Algorithm 1 Adversarial Attack Algorithm
Require: Detector D; Generator model Gθ; number of steps N ;
number of sequence completions r; learning rate α; pretrain
dataset Xpre.
1: Initialize Gθ with random weights θ
2: Pretrain Gθ on Xpre
3: Initialize Q¯1 by generating 500 sequences from Gθ .
4: for n in 1:N do
5: Generate a sequence X = (x1, ..., xT ) ∼ Gθ
6: for t in 1:T do
7: Using Gθ , generate r distinct sequence completions start-
ing from X1:t
8: Use D to assign an anomaly score to each completed se-
quence and calculate an average score Qt.
9: end for
10: Update θ using Eq. 1.
11: Calculate Q¯n+1
12: end for
3 EXPERIMENTS
We used publicly available data to validate our adversarial attack al-
gorithm and to analyze whether robustness to that attack varies with
the level of dropout regularization. Section 3.1 describes the dataset
used. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 respectively describe the detector and gen-
erator models. Those sections also describe how those models were
trained. Section 3.4 examines the impact of dropout on adversarial
robustness.
3.1 Data
Experiments were performed using publicly available data from Los
Alamos National Lab (LANL) [9, 10].4 The data includes 58 days of
authentication logs from their internal computer network. Each day
has between 4 and 8 million log lines. A few example log lines from
this dataset are displayed in Figure 1.
4 Data available at https://csr.lanl.gov/data/cyber1/.
Figure 1. Example Log Lines from the LANL Data
Each log line has comma separated fields in the following or-
der: “time, source user, destination user, source computer, destination
computer, authentication type, logon type, authentication orientation,
success/failure.” The data was anonymized by replacing values with
unique tokens, e.g., U14 replaces a user name. A small number of
individual log lines (<.001%) are marked as involved in red team
activity. We did not use these labels for training, but only to provide
an initial evaluation of our detector models before putting them in
the adversarial attack algorithm.
Of the 58 days, we used data from days 8, 9, and 50. Day 8 is used
to train the detector models. Day 9 was used as a test set to provide
an initial measure of how well the detector models were performing.
The choice of separate days for train and test follows work by Brown
et al. [1] and was done to emulate a cyber security workflow where
data from a previous day is used to evaluate current activity. Data
from day 9 was also used when evaluating the detector’s ability to
distinguish real data from fake data created by the generator.
Lastly, half a percent of the day 50 data was used as the pretrain
data for the generator. We added noise by randomly shuffling the data
within each column. For example, an entry in the ”source computer”
field would still be in that field, but assigned to a random row. This
shuffling was done to match the assumption that the pretrain data
gives some basic structure and vocabulary of the logs, but is too noisy
to train a useful generator on its own. The relatively small size and
the fact that we use a data from a distant day is also helpful in this
regard.
3.2 Detector Model
For the detector models, we followed the training method in Brown
et al. [1] who also worked with the LANL dataset.5 However, we
did not use an LSTM model as they did, but instead used the encoder
portion of the transformer model [21]. We did this to sharpen the con-
trast with our generator model architecture. We trained six different
detector models that differed only in their level of dropout probabil-
ity. The dropout probability levels used were 0%, 10%, 30%, 50%,
70%, and 90%.
The transformer encoder we used had 8 heads, 1 layer, and a model
dimension of 512. Additional layers were experimented with, but did
not meaningfully impact the detector’s performance, so one layer was
used to speed training time. The output of the transformer encoder
was passed to a fully connected layer with one node for each word in
the detector’s vocabulary. The detector’s vocabulary was determined
by the training data with a word needing to appear 40 times in the
dataset to be included. The vocabulary also included an “out of vo-
cabulary” token for unknown words.
We trained the detector to predict the next word in each log line
using the words that came before. To do so the words from i + 1
onward were masked when predicting the ith word. Cross entropy
loss and the Adam optimizer (β1, β2 = .9, .999) were used with
a learning rate of 10−4. The summed cross entropy loss for each
word of a log line was used as the anomaly score. This captures how
unusual the detector finds the line. Each model was trained over four
5 Brown et al. present two categories of models: the “event model” and the
“tiered event model”. We used the former.
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epochs on day 8 of the LANL dataset, which was enough to converge
without over fitting.
As an initial benchmark of performance, we used day 9 data to
calculate test loss and ability to detect red team activity. The ability
to detect red team activity was measured by the AUC (Area Under
the ROC Curve) when using the anomaly scores to predict the red
team labels. Table 1 reports these results. Notice that performance
generally declines as dropout probability increases, with a notable
drop in performance at 90% dropout. Hence, from this evaluation the
90% dropout model appears suboptimal.
Table 1. Detector Performance by Dropout
Dropout Probability Red Team Detection AUC Loss
0% 0.991 1.898
10% 0.992 1.934
30% 0.992 1.994
50% 0.990 2.327
70% 0.987 2.378
90% 0.933 3.206
3.3 Generator Model
Our generator model used a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) ar-
chitecture [7]. The log lines were fed into a word embedding layer
of dimension 256 which were then passed to an LSTM with hidden
size 256. At each step of the LSTM, the output was passed through
a dropout layer with drop probability of 50%, and then a fully con-
nected layer that predicts the next word. A softmax operator is used
on the values of the fully connected layer to generate a distribution
over the next word.
The model was pretrained on one half of one percent of day 50
data with shuffled columns, as described above. The data was split
into 80% train set and 20% test set. The pretain dataset was used
to set the vocabulary of the generator model, which determines the
number of embeddings used on the input and the number of possible
output words. The pretraining lasted for 20 epochs, which was deter-
mined by an early stopping rule based on when the test loss started
to increase. Cross entropy loss was used with a learning rate of 10−4
and the Adam optimizer (β1, β2 = .9, .999).
Next, the generator was trained using the adversarial attack algo-
rithm described in Section 2. We repeated this process six times, once
for each of the six detectors with the varying levels of dropout. We
used a learning rate of α = 10−5, the number of sequence com-
pletions per step was set as r = 50, and the number of steps was
N = 100, 000.
Every 2,500 steps, 20,000 log lines were generated and a mean
anomaly score was calculated. These means are shown in Figure 2
for the six detector models. The dotted line in each figure gives the
average anomaly score assigned by that detector model on real log
lines from day 9 of the LANL dataset. Figure 2 demonstrates that the
adversarial training successfully improves the generator’s ability to
fool the detector model in the sense of decreasing the mean anomaly
score of the fake log lines. In every case, except for 90% dropout,
these means are near or below the mean anomaly score of real data.
Also, note that in each case the average anomaly score for the fake
data starts much higher than the dotted lines. This indicates that the
generator models are not effective with just the pretraining, validat-
ing our assumption that the pretrain data is not useful on its own.
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Figure 2. Average anomaly scores during the adversarial training process
Notably, these average anomaly scores are not comparable across
the different models. Different detector models assign different dis-
tributions of anomaly scores, as can be seen by the different levels
of the dotted in each graph of Figure 2. In the next section we use a
different metric to compare across dropout levels, which we turn to
now.
3.4 Dropout Impact
We now look at how the dropout level of the detector model impacts
robustness to adversarial attack. To measure this robustness, we cal-
culate the AUC score when using the detector’s anomaly score to dis-
tinguish which log lines are real and which are fake. The AUC score
provides a comparable metric across the different detector models,
since it depends only on the ordinal rank of the anomaly scores.
Moreover, the AUC score is sensitive to the entire distribution of
anomaly scores instead of just capturing one element such as the
mean.
Table 2 shows the AUC scores for the varying levels of detector
dropout. The AUC score was measured at the end of the 100,000
steps of adversarial training. A dataset of 40,0000 examples was
used, consisting of half data drawn from day 9 of LANL dataset and
half fake data created by the generator model. While not displayed
in Table 2, the initial AUC score for each model was very close to 1
(> .99) for each of the six detector models, which further validates
the assumption that the pretraining cannot deliver a useful model.
Table 2 shows a distinct trend of higher dropout probability lead-
ing to higher robustness against adversarial attack, as measured by a
higher AUC score. The only exception is the 30% dropout probabil-
ity having a higher AUC score than 50%. The highest AUC score by
a significant margin occurs at 90% dropout, which is also the only
AUC score greater than .5. An AUC of .5 is what could be achieved
by a model guessing randomly. Hence, the 90% dropout is the only
dropout level that is truly effective at warding off the adversarial at-
tack.
A dropout level of 90% is much higher than typically seen in
transformer models. For example the paper that introduced the trans-
former model [21] used dropout between 10% and 30%. It is notable
that dropout 90% had the worst baseline performance when there
was no adversary, as we saw in Table 1. This suggests a trade-off be-
tween baseline performance and adversarial robustness, which is in
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line with what has been observed elsewhere [17].
Table 2. AUC Scores by Dropout
Dropout Probability AUC Score
0% 0.165
10% 0.272
30% 0.329
50% 0.277
70% 0.422
90% 0.680
A common pitfall with this type of adversarial training is that the
generator might collapse into producing the same log line over and
over again. The AUC score would not necessarily detect this, since
that one log line could have a low anomaly score and hence pass
detection. Figure 3 shows the percentage of duplicates present in
the 20,000 generated logs lines used to calculate the mean anomaly
scores seen in Figure 2. More precisely, the y-axis of the figure is the
percentage of logs lines that would need to be removed in order to
make the set of logs lines fully unique.
The amount of duplicate log lines does increases as training goes
on, but at no point is the duplicates percentage more than 30%. More-
over, higher dropout models do not exhibit a higher duplicate per-
centages. In fact, the 90% dropout model has a notably lower dupli-
cate percentage for most of the training process. This shows that the
higher AUC of the higher dropout models is not due to those models
creating more duplicates.
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Figure 3. Percentage of duplicate log lines generated over the course of
training
We also recalculated the AUC scores after forcing the generator
model to create 20,000 unique log lines. This was done by contin-
uously generating log lines until a set of 20,000 fully unique log
lines had been created. The AUC score was then calculated in the
same way as before using the 20,000 unique log lines. The result are
shown in Table 3. These results are very similar to Table 2, which
again shows that model collapse was not an important feature of our
results.
Table 3. AUC Scores by Dropout with Unique Dataset
Dropout Probability AUC Score
0% 0.169
10% 0.273
30% 0.333
50% 0.274
70% 0.428
90% 0.679
4 DISCUSSION
In this paper, we developed a way to test the adversarial robustness
of machine-learning based cyber defenses. Our framework studies
the case where an adversary has captured a black-box copy of an
anomaly detection model on log data. We use a publicly available
dataset to show that this type of defensive approach is in fact vulner-
able to attack. We also apply our framework to evaluate the impact of
dropout levels on the detector model’s robustness against an adver-
sarial attack. We find that robustness increases with the drop proba-
bility, with a significant jump occurring at 90%, which is well above
the typical range.
Dropout regularization is often understood as effectively creating
an ensemble of different models within a single neural network [6].
This provides a possible explanation for why dropout is effective in
increasing adversarial robustness. It is naturally harder to reverse en-
gineer the decision rule of an ensemble of models as opposed to a
single model, which makes the generator’s task more difficult. This
suggests the possibility of using an actual ensemble of models to in-
crease adversarial robustness. Another natural avenue to explore is
other types of regularization besides dropout, such as L2 or early
stopping. We view our results here as only a starting point for this
investigation, with many more possible avenues open for future re-
search.
Another potential direction for future work is whether our adver-
sarial attack framework could be modified to dispense with the pre-
train data entirely. This would answer whether an attack could suc-
ceed against a system where the attacker has no frame of reference
for what the data looks like. We hypothesize that doing such an at-
tack would require an initial step to discover basic structural facts
about the data, such as a rough range of sequence lengths and a par-
tial vocabulary. The feasibility of such a step depends on whether the
feedback from the detector makes fine enough distinctions. For ex-
ample, does the detector differentiate between an input where only
one of the token is in the detector’s expected vocabulary versus an
input that has no tokens in the detector’s expected vocabulary. A de-
tector that makes fine enough distinctions would score both inputs as
anomalous, but the latter as being more so. The detector model we
used in our experiments does make this type of distinction, but others
may not.
In this paper, we focused on the case of attacking anomaly detec-
tion models that use log data. However, our framework is more gen-
eral than that. The detector can be any model that returns feedback on
how suspicious it finds each input. The detector does not even need
to be a machine learning model. For example, a rules-based system
that returns either alert or no alert on each input could be used in our
framework. Additionally, the input data does not have to be log data,
but can be any type of sequence data, which includes network packet
captures or command-line inputs by a user. Log data is a a good fit
with the natural language techniques we used, but those techniques
are not limited to that use case.
5
We conclude by noting that our approach draws inspiration from
the software testing domain, where code is rigorously tested for prob-
lematic inputs that cause bugs or crashes. Of course, those problem-
atic inputs are precisely what malicious attackers are looking to find,
so deliberately uncovering them poses a certain amount of risk. How-
ever, it is generally considered better to know about such potential
vulnerabilities so that they can be addressed rather than simply hope
that attackers will not discover them. This is the same perspective
that we take in our work here. Our adversarial attack algorithm un-
covers an effective method defensive detector. However, we do so in
service of searching for how to best prepare against such an attack.
REFERENCES
[1] Andy Brown, Aaron Tuor, Brian Hutchinson, and Nicole Nichols, ‘Re-
current Neural Network Attention Mechanisms for Interpretable Sys-
tem Log Anomaly Detection’, arXiv:1803.04967 [cs, stat], (March
2018).
[2] Anna L. Buczak and Erhan Guven, ‘A Survey of Data Mining and Ma-
chine Learning Methods for Cyber Security Intrusion Detection’, IEEE
Communications Surveys & Tutorials, 18(2), 1153–1176, (22).
[3] Raghavendra Chalapathy and Sanjay Chawla, ‘Deep Learning for
Anomaly Detection: A Survey’, arXiv:1901.03407 [cs, stat], (January
2019).
[4] Min Du, Feifei Li, Guineng Zheng, and Vivek Srikumar, ‘DeepLog:
Anomaly Detection and Diagnosis from System Logs through Deep
Learning’, in Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on
Computer and Communications Security - CCS ’17, pp. 1285–1298,
Dallas, Texas, USA, (2017). ACM Press.
[5] Ian J. Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian Szegedy, ‘Explain-
ing and Harnessing Adversarial Examples’, arXiv:1412.6572 [cs, stat],
(March 2015).
[6] Geoffrey E. Hinton, Nitish Srivastava, Alex Krizhevsky, Ilya Sutskever,
and Ruslan R. Salakhutdinov, ‘Improving neural networks by prevent-
ing co-adaptation of feature detectors’, arXiv:1207.0580 [cs], (July
2012).
[7] Sepp Hochreiter and Ju¨rgen Schmidhuber, ‘Long Short-Term Memory’,
Neural Computation, 9(8), 1735–1780, (November 1997).
[8] Weiwei Hu and Ying Tan, ‘Black-Box Attacks against RNN Based Mal-
ware Detection Algorithms’, 7.
[9] Alexander D. Kent, Comprehensive, Multi-Source Cyber-Security
Events, 2015. Published: Los Alamos National Laboratory.
[10] Alexander D. Kent, ‘Cybersecurity Data Sources for Dynamic Network
Research’, in Dynamic Networks in Cybersecurity. Imperial College
Press, (June 2015).
[11] Diederik P. Kingma and Jimmy Ba, ‘Adam: A Method for Stochastic
Optimization’, arXiv:1412.6980 [cs], (January 2017).
[12] Jiwei Li, Will Monroe, Tianlin Shi, Se´bastien Jean, Alan Ritter, and Dan
Jurafsky, ‘Adversarial learning for neural dialogue generation’, arXiv
preprint arXiv:1701.06547, (2017).
[13] Zilong Lin, Yong Shi, and Zhi Xue, ‘IDSGAN: Generative Adver-
sarial Networks for Attack Generation against Intrusion Detection’,
arXiv:1809.02077 [cs], (June 2019).
[14] Sean Saito and Sujoy Roy, ‘Effects of Loss Functions And Target Rep-
resentations on Adversarial Robustness’, arXiv:1812.00181 [cs, stat],
(March 2020).
[15] Richard S Sutton, David A McAllester, Satinder P Singh, and Yishay
Mansour, ‘Policy Gradient Methods for Reinforcement Learning with
Function Approximation’, Advances in neural information processing
systems, (2000).
[16] Christian Szegedy, Wojciech Zaremba, Ilya Sutskever, Joan Bruna, Du-
mitru Erhan, Ian Goodfellow, and Rob Fergus, ‘Intriguing properties of
neural networks’, arXiv:1312.6199 [cs], (February 2014).
[17] Dimitris Tsipras, Shibani Santurkar, Logan Engstrom, Alexander
Turner, and Aleksander Madry, ‘Robustness May Be at Odds with Ac-
curacy’, arXiv:1805.12152 [cs, stat], (September 2019).
[18] Aaron Tuor, Ryan Baerwolf, Nicolas Knowles, Brian Hutchinson,
Nicole Nichols, and Robert Jasper, ‘Recurrent Neural Network Lan-
guage Models for Open Vocabulary Event-Level Cyber Anomaly De-
tection’, 10.
[19] Aaron Tuor, Samuel Kaplan, Brian Hutchinson, Nicole Nichols, and
Sean Robinson, ‘Deep Learning for Unsupervised Insider Threat De-
tection in Structured Cybersecurity Data Streams’, 8.
[20] Muhammad Usama, Muhammad Asim, Siddique Latif, Junaid Qadir,
and Ala-Al-Fuqaha, ‘Generative Adversarial Networks For Launching
and Thwarting Adversarial Attacks on Network Intrusion Detection
Systems’, in 2019 15th International Wireless Communications Mobile
Computing Conference (IWCMC), pp. 78–83, (June 2019).
[21] Ashish Vaswani, Noam Shazeer, Niki Parmar, Jakob Uszkoreit, Llion
Jones, Aidan N Gomez, Łukasz Kaiser, and Illia Polosukhin, ‘Attention
is All you Need’, in Advances in Neural Information Processing Sys-
tems 30, eds., I. Guyon, U. V. Luxburg, S. Bengio, H. Wallach, R. Fer-
gus, S. Vishwanathan, and R. Garnett, 5998–6008, Curran Associates,
Inc., (2017).
[22] Ronald J Williams, ‘Simple statistical gradient-following algorithms
for connectionist reinforcement learning’, Machine Learning, 8(3-4),
229–256, (1992).
[23] Chuanlong Yin, Yuefei Zhu, Jinlong Fei, and Xinzheng He, ‘A Deep
Learning Approach for Intrusion Detection Using Recurrent Neural
Networks’, IEEE Access, 5, 21954–21961, (2017).
[24] Lantao Yu, Weinan Zhang, Jun Wang, and Yong Yu, ‘SeqGAN: Se-
quence Generative Adversarial Nets with Policy Gradient’, in Pro-
ceedings of the Thirty-First AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
(2017).
6
